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Abstract
This paper presents an econometric approach to estimate the behavioral eﬀects of
counterfactual policy experiments in the context of dynamic decision models where the
current utility function and the distribution of unobservables are nonparametrically
speciﬁed. Previous studies have shown that the identiﬁcation of the current utility
function in dynamic decision models requires of stronger assumptions than in static
decision models. We show in this paper that knowledge of the current utility func-
tion (or of a "normalized" utility function) is not necessary to identify counterfactual
choice probabilities in dynamic models. To identify these counterfactuals we need the
probability distribution of the unobservables and the diﬀerence between the present
value of choosing always the same alternative and the present value of deviating one
period from this strategy. We show that both functions are identiﬁed from the factual
choice probabilities under similar conditions as in static decision models. Based on
this result we propose a nonparametric procedure to estimate the behavioral eﬀects
of counterfactual experiments in dynamic decision models. We apply this method to
evaluate the eﬀects of an investment subsidy program in the context of a model of
machine replacement.
Keywords: Dynamic discrete decision processes; Nonparametric identiﬁcation; Coun-
terfactual experiments.
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Discrete choice dynamic structural models have proven useful tools for the assessment of
public policy initiatives. These econometric models have been applied to the evaluation of
diﬀerent economic policies, both factual and counterfactual, like welfare policies (Sanders
and Miller, 1997, Keane and Moﬃt, 1998, and Keane and Wolpin, 2000), unemployment in-
surance (Ferrall, 1997), social security and retirement (Berkovec and Stern, 1991, and Rust
and Phelan, 1997), patents regulation (Pakes, 1986, and Pakes and Simpsom, 1989), educa-
tion policies (Eckstein and Zilcha, 1994, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999, and Keane and Wolpin,
2001), contraceptive choice (Hotz and Miller, 1993), regulation on labor contracts (Aguirre-
gabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 1999, and Rota, 2004), programs on child poverty (Wolpin and
Todd, 2003), scrapping subsidies (Adda and Cooper, 2000), or regulation of nuclear plants
(Rust and Rothwell, 1995).
A common feature of the econometric models in these applications is the parametric spec-
iﬁcation of structural functions like agents’ utilities, transition probabilities of state variables,
and the probability distributions of unobservables.1 T h e s ep a r a m e t r i cm o d e l sc o n t r a s tw i t h
the emphasis on nonparametric speciﬁcation that we ﬁnd in other approaches to evaluate
public policies. In particular, the literature on evaluation of treatment eﬀects has emphasized
t h ei m p o r t a n c eo fan o n p a r a m e t r i cs p e c i ﬁcation of the distribution of unobservables to obtain
robust results (see Heckman and Robb, 1985, Manski, 1990, and more recently Heckman and
Smith, 1998, and Heckman and Vyltacil, 1999). An important factor that has contributed
t ot h ep a r a m e t r i cs p e c i ﬁcation of dynamic discrete structural models has been the negative
results on the nonparametric identiﬁcation of the utility function in these models. As shown
by Rust (1994) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002), the diﬀerences between the utilities of two
choice alternatives cannot be identiﬁed in dynamic decision models even when the researcher
"knows" the time discount factor, the probability distribution of the unobservables, and the
transition probabilities of the state variables. This under-identiﬁcation result contrasts with
the identiﬁcation of utility diﬀerences in static (i.e., not forward looking) decision models
(see Matzkin, 1992).
This paper takes a diﬀerent look at the problem of nonparametric identiﬁcation of dy-
namic decision models. Instead of looking at the nonparametric identiﬁcation of the utility
function or of utility diﬀerences we consider the identiﬁcation of the behavioral eﬀects of
counterfactual policy changes. That is, we study the identiﬁcation of the choice probabilities
associated with hypothetical changes in the utility function. We show that knowledge of
1An exception is the semiparametric model in Taber (2000) where utilities are parametrically speciﬁed
but the distribution of the unobservables is nonparametric.
1the current utility function or of utility diﬀerences is not necessary to identify counterfac-
tual choice probabilities in dynamic decision models. These counterfactuals depend on the
distribution of unobservables and on the diﬀerence between the value of choosing always
t h es a m ea l t e r n a t i v ea n dt h ev a l u eo fd e v i a t i n go n ep e r i o df r o mt h a tp o l i c y .W es h o wt h a t
these functions are identiﬁed under similar conditions as in static models. Therefore, though
agents’ preferences cannot be identiﬁed, we can identify the behavioral eﬀects associated
with changes in these preferences.
Based on this identiﬁcation result we propose a nonparametric procedure to estimate the
behavioral eﬀects of counterfactual experiments in this class of models. The computational
cost of this method is equivalent to solving the dynamic programming problem twice (i.e.,
before and after the policy change). Therefore, from a computational point of view, the
method is at least as feasible as a structural parametric approach. In order to analyze
the ability of this method to provide informative estimates of policy eﬀects, we implement
a Monte Carlo experiment. In this experiment we evaluate the eﬀects of an investment
subsidy program in the context of a model of machine replacement. We show that the
method provides precise estimates of policy eﬀects when these eﬀects are aggregated over
some of the state variables.
This paper is related to the analysis in Heckman and Navarro (2005). These authors
present a comprehensive study on semiparametric identiﬁcation of dynamic discrete choice
models that includes a wide range of reduced form models, but also a subclass of the struc-
tural models that we consider in this paper. There are important diﬀerences between our
paper and Heckman and Navarro’s analysis of structural models. First, they study semipara-
metric identiﬁcation of the complete structure of the model, while we consider nonparametric
identiﬁcation of counterfactual choice probabilities. Second, they consider ﬁnite horizon op-
timal stopping problems and prove identiﬁcation using backward induction. Instead we
consider a general class of models proposed by Rust (1994) that encompasses both inﬁnite
horizon and ﬁnite horizon problems and not only optimal stopping problems. We cannot use
backward induction to prove identiﬁcation. Instead, we show that our objects of interest are
unique ﬁxed points of contraction mappings that depend only on the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, the basic
assumptions and the type of counterfactual policy experiments that we want to evaluate.
Section 3 contains the identiﬁcation results. We describe the estimation procedure in section
4. The Monte Carlo experiment is in section 5. We summarize and conclude in section 6.
T h ep r o o f so fp r o p o s i t i o n sa r ei nt h ea p p e n d i x .
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2.1 Framework and basic assumptions
Time is discrete an indexed by t. Consider an agent who has preferences deﬁned over a
sequence of states of the world from period t =0to t = T.A s t a t e o f t h e w o r l d h a s t w o
components: a vector of state variables st that is given at period t; and a discrete decision
at ∈ A = {0,1,...,J} that the agent chooses at period t. The decision at period t aﬀects the
evolution of future values of the state variables. The agent’s preferences over possible se-




where β ∈ [0,1) is the discount factor and Ut(at,s t) is the current utility function at pe-
riod t.2 The agent has uncertainty about future values of state variables. His beliefs about
future states can be represented by a sequence of Markov transition probability functions
Fs,t(st+1|a,s). These beliefs are rational in the sense that they are the true transition proba-
bilities of the state variables. Every period t the agent observes the vector of state variables






j Ut(at+j,s t+j) | at,s t
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(1)
Let αt(s) and Vt(s)be the optimal decision rule and the value function at period t, respec-
tively. By Bellman principle of optimality the sequence of value functions can be obtained









For the rest of the paper we adopt a notation that omits the time subindex from functions
and variables. A ﬁnite-horizon dynamic decision problem can be represented as an inﬁnite-
horizon problem if we just make the utility functions equal to zero for any period t>T .
Furthermore, we can include the time period t as a state variable of the model and therefore
we can omit it as an index in the structural functions and in the optimal decision rule and
the value function. Finally, we can also omit the time subindex in the decision and state
variables and use (a,s) to represent current values of these variables, and (a0,s 0) for next
period values.
From the point of view of the observing researcher there are two types of state variables,
s =( x,ξ), where the vector x is observable to the researcher and the vector ξ is unobservable.
Without loss of generality we can write the one-period utility as the sum of two components:
U(a,s)=u(a,x)+ε(a,x,ξ), (3)
2In fact, the function U(.,.) is an indirect utility function that incorporates implicitly the agent’s budget
constraint and other possible constraints.
3where u(a,x) ≡ E (U(a,s) | a,x) and ε(a,x,ξ) ≡ U(a,s)−E (U(a,s) | a,x). For notational
simplicity we use ε(a) to denote ε(a,x,ξ). We use also the vector ε = {ε(a):a ∈ A} instead
of ξ to represent unobservable state variables. Note that, by deﬁnition, the random variables
in ε have zero mean and are mean independent of x. W ef o l l o wR u s t( 1 9 9 4 )a n dc o n s i d e r
the following assumptions on the distribution of the state variables.
ASSUMPTION 1: The cumulative transition probability of the state variables factors as
Fs(s0|a,s)=Fε(ε0) Fx(x0|a,x).
Under this assumption the optimal decision rule α(x,ε) can be described as:
α(x,ε) = argmax
a∈A
{ v(a,x)+ε(a) } (4)
where v(a,x) is the expected discounted value of current and future utilities if current decision










The functions v(0,x), v(1,x),. . . ,v(J,x) are called conditional choice value functions.
From the point of view of the researcher, who does not observe ε, agents’ optimal behavior




The reduced form of the model consists of this optimal choice probability function and the
transition probability function Fx(x0|a,x).T h e model structure consists of the functions
{u,Fε,F x} and the discount factor β.
2.2 Data and identiﬁcation of the reduced form
Suppose that there is a population of individuals who behave according to this model. We
have a random sample of individuals from this population and we observe {ai,x i,x 0
i} for
each individual i.A su s u a l ,w es t u d yi d e n t i ﬁcation with a very large (i.e., inﬁnite) sample.
Furthermore, we assume that the sample has variability over the whole support A×X ×X
of the variables {a,x,x0}. This assumption of full-support variation is needed to identify the
reduced form of the model. The assumption implies diﬀerent data requirements depending
on the type of model. In stationary models, a cross-section of individuals is enough to get
full support variation. This is also the case in life-cycle models where the agent’s age is a
state variable, as long as the cross-section includes individuals of all ages and the vector of
state variables does not include calendar time and the individual’s cohort. If both age and
4cohort are state variables, we need panel data or repeated cross-sections to guarantee full
support variability. In models with aggregate state variables we typically need panel data
with a long time dimension to guarantee that aggregate variables have variation over their
full support. However, Altug and Miller (1998) show that under some assumptions on the
eﬀects of aggregate variables, we can identify the reduce form with a short panel.
Under the assumption of rational expectations, it is clear that we can identify Fx(x0|a,x)
on A × X × X from the transition probabilities Pr(x0
i = x0|ai = a,xi = x) in the data.
Furthermore, under the assumption of agents’ optimal behavior, the optimal probability
function P(a|x) can be identify on A × X from the probabilities Pr(ai = a|xi = x) in
the data. Thus, the reduced form probability functions P and Fx are nonparametrically
identiﬁed on their respective supports.
However, we cannot identify the structural functions {u,Fε} without further restrictions
on the primitives of the model. This is the case both in decision models where agents
are forward looking (i.e., β>0) and in models where agents are myopic (i.e., β =0 ).
In this paper we are not interested in the identiﬁcation of the complete structure of the
model. Instead we consider the identiﬁcation of individuals’ predicted behavior (i.e., optimal
probability functions) associated with a counterfactual change in the utility function. Next
section describes the type of policy experiments that this paper is concerned with.
2.3 Policy experiments
S u p p o s et h a tw ek n o wt h er e d u c e df o r m{P,Fx} associated with a structure {u,Fε,F x,β}.
We want to evaluate the behavioral eﬀects of an hypothetical policy intervention that modi-




The function τ(.,.) represents the change in the current utility induced by the hypothetical
policy. Note that this change can vary across observable state variables and across choice
alternatives in a completely unrestricted way. The only restriction is that it does not depend
on unobservable state variables.4 The researcher does not know neither the factual nor the
3Note that the function U(.,.) is an indirect utility function. That is, it incorporates the agent’s budget
constraint and other possible restrictions. Therefore, the policy intervention does not modify agents’ prefer-
ences but earnings and expenditures that appear in the budget constraint or in other relevant constraints.
4Though we consider that the change in the current utility function does not depend on unobservable
state variables, all our results can be easily extended to the case in which the utility change has the following
form:
U∗(a,s)=U(a,s)+τ(a,x)+h(x) ε(a)
where both τ(a,x) and h(x) are known, and ε(a) i st h es a m eu n o b s e r v a b l ev a r i a b l ea sb e f o r et h ep o l i c y
change.
5counterfactual utility functions, but he knows the utility changes τ(a,x) because these are
given by the policy he wants to evaluate.




Also by deﬁnition, ε(a) ≡ U(a,s)−u(a,s) and ε∗(a) ≡ U∗(a,s)−u∗(a,s).T h i si m p l i e st h a t
ε∗(a)=ε(a) and F∗
ε = Fε. That is, the policy change only modiﬁes the part of the utility
associated with (a,x) and therefore it does not alter the distribution of the unobservable
state variables. Note that the transition probability functions of the state variables are also
unaﬀected. Therefore, the counterfactual structure is {u∗,F ε,F x,β}.
Let P∗ be the optimal choice probability function associated with the counterfactual
structure. The diﬀerence between the functions P∗ and P represents the behavioral eﬀects
of the policy from the point of view of the econometrician. Given our knowledge of {P,Fx,τ}
we want to identify nonparametrically the counterfactual choice probabilities.
2.4 Example: Machine replacement and investment subsidies
Dynamic structural models of machine replacement have been considered before by, among
others, Rust (1986 and 1987), Sturm (1991), Das (1992), Kennet (1993 and 1994), Rust
and Rothwell (1995), Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999), Adda and Cooper (2000), Cho
(2002), and Kasahara (2004). Most of these studies use the estimated structural model to
evaluate the behavioral eﬀects of a policy change. Kennet (1993) studies how deregulation of
the US airline industry aﬀected the number of aircraft engine hours between major overhauls.
Rust and Rothwell (1995) analyze the impact on the operation of US nuclear power plants of
an increase in the intensity of safety regulation by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
after an accident on March 1979. Adda and Cooper (2000) evaluate the eﬀects of a policy
in France in which the government subsidized the replacement of old cars with new ones.
Kasahara (2004) examines the impact on ﬁrms’ investment in equipment of a temporary
increase in import tariﬀsi nC h i l e .
The model that we present here is similar to the one in Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power
(1999). Consider a ﬁrm that produces a good using capital and some perfectly ﬂexible
inputs. Output depends on the stock of capital Kt, the amount of variable inputs, and a
shock to total factor productivity ωt.T h ep r o ﬁt function in this model is an indirect proﬁt
where we have already solved the optimal amounts of variable inputs. Given the productivity
shock and the capital stock, the ﬁrm decides whether to replace the existing capital with
a new machine or continuing with the same capital for another period. Let at ∈ {0,1} be
6the indicator of the machine replacement decision. If the producer decides not to replace,
the machine depreciates at rate λ such that Kt =( 1− λ) Kt−1. If the producer chooses
replacement, then the capital stock associated with a new machine is Kt =1 .T h u s , t h e
transition rule for the capital stock is:
Kt = at +( 1− at)( 1− λ) Kt−1 (9)
The productivity shock follows an exogenous Markov process with transition probability
function Fω(ωt+1|ωt).
The proﬁt function has the following form:
Ut = y(ωt,K t) − ( mc(Kt)+ξ1t ) − at ( rc(Kt−1)+ξ2t ) (10)
y(.,.) is the production function. mc(Kt)+ξ1t is the machine maintenance cost, that depends
on the age of capital through the function mc(.).T h e t e r m ξ1t is a random shock in the
maintenance cost that is unobservable to the researcher. rc(Kt)+ξ2t is the replacement
cost net of the scrapping value of the retired capital. The term ξ2t is a random shock in
the replacement cost that is also unobservable to the researcher. Following the notation in
section 2.1, we have that x =( ωt,K t−1), εt(0) = −ξ1t, εt(1) = −ξ1t − ξ2t,a n d :
u(at,x t)=
½
y(ωt,(1 − λ)Kt−1) − mc((1 − λ)Kt−1) if at =0
y(ωt,1) − mc(1) − rc((1 − λ)Kt−1) if at =1 (11)
Let Aget ∈ {0,1,2,...} be the age of the machine at the beginning of period t,b e f o r et h e
replacement decision. The evolution of Aget is: Aget+1 =( 1−at)( Aget +1 ) . There is a one-
to-one relationship between capital stock and the age of the machine: i.e., Kt−1 =( 1−λ)Aget
Therefore, we can use either Aget instead of Kt−1 as state variable of the model.
Suppose that we are interested in evaluating the eﬀects of a counterfactual policy that
modiﬁes ﬁrms’ replacement costs. This policy tries to promote the retirement of old capital
by providing a subsidy that depends on the age of the retired capital. The amount of the













if Age ≤ Aget ≤ Age
0 if Aget > Age
(12)
where τ0 > 0, τ1 > 0, Age and Age are parameters that characterize the policy. The subsidy
is zero if replacement takes place either too early or too late. For replacement ages within
the range [Age,Age] the subsidy is strictly positive and it decreases linearly with the age of
7capital. This type of policy has been common in many countries and it has been motivated
as part of an environmental policy to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide.
Let P∗(ωt,Age t) be the replacement probability function under the new policy. Given
this probability function, together with the stochastic process of the productivity shock, we
can derive diﬀerent interesting measures on the eﬀect of the policy, both in the long run and
during the transition period to the new steady-state.
(a) Changes in the age distribution of capital. The joint (steady-state) distribution of the
age of capital and the productivity shock, H∗(Age,ω), is the solution to the following system
of equations:
For Age =0: H∗(ω,0) =
P∞
j=1 P∗(ω,j) H∗(ω,j)
For Age > 0: H∗(ω,Age)=( 1 − P∗(ω,Age− 1)) H∗(ω,Age− 1)
(13)
To obtain the marginal distribution for the age of capital we integrate H∗(ω,Age) over the
productivity shock: ¯ H∗(Age)=
R
H∗(Age,ω) dω.
(b) Change in aggregate investment. Let I and I∗ be the factual and the counterfactual
aggregate investments, respectively. We can get these aggregate variables by integrating the








∗(j,ω) d ¯ Fω(ω) (14)
3I d e n t i ﬁcation
This section presents our identiﬁcation results. In order to illustrate the diﬀerences and
similarities between dynamic and static decision models in the identiﬁcation of counterfac-
tual choice probabilities, we start with the identiﬁcation of static decision models in section
3.1. Then, section 3.2 presents our identiﬁcation results for dynamic decision models. Both
sections consider binary choice models. Section 3.3 explains how these results can be ex-
tended to the multinomial case. For notational simplicity, we use P(x) instead of P(1|x).to
represent the probability of choosing alternative 1 in the binary choice model.
3.1 Static model
Consider the model in section 2 but now the set of choice alternatives is binary and agents
are not forward looking, i.e., β =0 . The counterfactual choice probabilities in this static
model are:
P∗(x)=P r ( u∗(1,x)+ε(1) ≥ u∗(0,x)+ε(0) | x)
= F˜ ε (˜ u(x)+˜ τ(x)) (15)
8where ˜ u(x) ≡ u(1,x) − u(0,x), ˜ τ(x) ≡ τ(1,x) − τ(0,x),a n dF˜ ε is the distribution function
of the random variable ˜ ε ≡ ε(0) − ε(1). This expression illustrates that the identiﬁcation
of P∗(.) requires one to identify the functions F˜ ε and ˜ u. The relationship between these
functions and the factual reduced form probability function P(.) is:
P(x)=F˜ ε (˜ u(x)) (16)
Manski (1988) provided a very comprehensive analysis of diﬀerent identiﬁcation condi-
t i o n sf o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hF˜ ε is nonparametrically speciﬁed but ˜ u is parametric and linear,
i.e., ˜ u(x)=x0θ. He also consider the case in which x and ˜ ε are not independently distributed
(e.g., quantile independence, index suﬃciency). Matzkin (1992) shows that it is possible to
identify F˜ ε and ˜ u without imposing any parametric structure in any of the two functions.
Let F be the space of possible ˜ u functions, and let ˜ u(X) ⊆ R be the space of real values that
the function ˜ u can take on X.T h a t i s ,˜ u(X) ≡ { ˜ u(x) ∈ R : x ∈ X }.T h e k e y c o n d i t i o n
that Matzkin considers to separate the inﬂuence of F˜ ε and ˜ u on P is the following.
Assumption W2 in Matzkin (1992): There is a subset ¯ X ⊂ X such that: (i) for any pair of
functions h, h0 ∈ F the diﬀerence h(x) − h0(x) is constant over the subset ¯ X; and (ii) for
every function h ∈ F and for every value r ∈ ˜ u(X) there is an x ∈ ¯ X such that h(x)=r.
Since all functions in F attain the same values on the subset ¯ X,d i ﬀerent values of the
probability P(x) on ¯ X should be attributed to the distribution function F˜ ε.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
W2(ii) implies that we can identify F˜ ε over the whole set ˜ u(X).
Matzkin shows that an example where assumption W2 holds is when the functions in F
are homogeneous of degree one. Here I consider a diﬀerent type of condition under which
assumption W2 holds. This condition holds in many applications of discrete choice models
where the econometrician observes an outcome variable that is part of the utility function,
e.g., individuals’ wages, ﬁrms’ output, etc.
ASSUMPTION 2: The current utility function can be written as:
u(a,x)=y(a,w,z)+c(a,z) (17)
where x =( w,z) ∈ W ×Z,a n dy(.,.,.) and c(.,.) are real valued functions such that: (i) the
function ˜ y(w,z) ≡ y(1,w,z) − y(0,w,z) is known to the researcher; (ii) w is a continuous
random variable and ˜ y(w,z) is strictly increasing in w; and (iii) for any z ∈ Z there is a
w ∈ W such that ˜ y(w,z)+˜ c(z)=0 ,w h e r e˜ c(z) ≡ c(1,z) − c(0,z).
Under this assumption, the set of admissible threshold functions F is such that for any
h ∈ F, h(w,z)=˜ y(w,z)+˜ c(z),w h e r e˜ y(w,z) is known and strictly increasing in w.T h i s
9restriction on the space F is a particular case of Matzkin’s assumption W2. To see this,
deﬁne ¯ X = W ×{ z0} where z0 is an arbitrary point in the space Z. For any two functions
h,h0 ∈ F and any (w,z0) ∈ ¯ X, the function h(w,z0) − h0(w,z0) depends only on z0 and
therefore it is constant over the subset ¯ X. This is Matzkin’s assumption W2(i). It is also
simple to verify that assumptions 2(i) and 2(ii) imply Matzkin’s assumption W2(ii).
As mentioned above, Assumption 2 holds in many applications of discrete choice models
where the researcher observes and outcome variable that is part of the utility function. Using
this outcome variable, together with observable decision and state variables, it is possible to
estimate the function y(.,.,.) that is a component of the utility function. For instance, this is
the case in models of individuals’ labor supply, labor force participation, occupational choice,
or schooling where earnings are observable to the researcher and they are a component of the
utility function. Other cases in which assumption 2 holds are in models of ﬁrms’ investment,
labor demand, inventory choice or pricing decisions where the ﬁrms’ sales are observable to
the econometrician and they are part of the proﬁt function.
Proposition 1 establishes the nonparametric identiﬁcation of the structural functions F˜ ε
and ˜ u and of the counterfactual probability function P∗ in this static model.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that the median of ˜ ε is zero.
Then, the function ˜ u(.) is nonparametrically identiﬁed on X, the distribution function F˜ ε
is nonparametrically identiﬁed over the set ˜ u(X), and the counterfactual choice probability
function P∗(.) is identiﬁed over the set X∗ = { x ∈ X :˜ u(x)+˜ τ(x) ∈ ˜ u(X) }.
The counterfactual probability function is identiﬁed on the set X∗ that is included in X.
However, there are diﬀerent cases in which X∗ = X.
Case I: ˜ u(X)=R. This is the case in models where the range of variation of the
function ˜ y(.,.), or of the function ˜ c(.), is the whole real line. Then, ˜ u(X)=R
and it is clear that this implies that X∗ = X.
Case II: ˜ u(X) is unbounded from above (below) and ˜ τ(.) is positive (negative)
valued. This is typically the case in applications where y(.,.,.) is an earnings
equation or a production function.
Case III: ˜ u(X) ⊂ R but ˜ τ(.) is such that supx∈X{˜ u(x)+˜ τ(x)} ≤ supx∈X{˜ u(x)}
and infx∈X{˜ u(x)+˜ τ(x)} ≥ infx∈X{˜ u(x)}. T h a ti s ,t h ep o l i c yt h a tw ew a n tt o
evaluate is such that it reduces (increases) the utility diﬀerential in states where
it is large (small).
103.2 Dynamic model
We now consider the identiﬁcation of counterfactual choice probabilities when agents are
forward looking, i.e., when β>0. The optimal choice probability function in this model is:
P(x)=F˜ ε (˜ v(x)) (18)
where ˜ v(x) ≡ v(1,x) − v(0,x) is the diﬀerential value function. The counterfactual choice
probability function is P∗(x)=F˜ ε (˜ v∗(x)),w h e r e˜ v∗(.) is the diﬀerential value function after
the policy change. We show in this section that the functions F˜ ε, ˜ v∗ and P∗ are identiﬁed
under similar conditions as in Proposition 1.
However, there are two main diﬀerences with the identiﬁcation in the static case. First,
in the dynamic model we cannot identify current utility diﬀerences ˜ u or any other function
that depends only on preferences and not on agent’s beliefs. That is, we cannot separate
agents’ preferences and agents’ beliefs. Despite this under-identiﬁcation of preferences, we
can identify the counterfactual choice probabilities. Second, given F˜ ε the identiﬁcation of P∗
in the static case is pointwise in the space X. That is, given the factual choice probability at
point x0 we can get the counterfactual probability at that point as P∗(x0)=F˜ ε(F
−1
˜ ε (P(x0)+
˜ τ(x0)),w h e r eF
−1
˜ ε (.) is the inverse function of F˜ ε. In contrast, in the dynamic case we need
the whole factual probability function P(.) to identify the counterfactual probability at a
single point.
For the sake of clarity, it is convenient to describe our identiﬁcation results in two steps.
First, we show the identiﬁcation of P∗ when the distribution F˜ ε is known. Second, we prove
the joint identiﬁcation of F˜ ε, ˜ v∗ and P∗.
3.2.1 Identiﬁcation with known F˜ ε
Suppose that the probability distribution F˜ ε is known to the researcher. Then, it is clear
that the diﬀerential value function ˜ v(.) is identiﬁed from the factual choice probabilities: i.e.,
˜ v(x)=F
−1
˜ ε (P(x)). In the static case, it is obvious that the identiﬁcation of the diﬀerential
utility function ˜ u implies the identiﬁcation of the counterfactuals ˜ u∗ and P∗ because ˜ u∗ =
˜ u +˜ τ and P∗(x)=F˜ ε (˜ u(x)+˜ τ(x)). However, that is not the case in the dynamic model.
Knowledge of the function ˜ v is not enough to identify the counterfactual ˜ v∗.T h e r e a s o n
is that ˜ v∗ i sn o tj u s taf u n c t i o no f˜ v and τ. To obtain how the policy change aﬀects the
diﬀerential value function (i.e., to obtain ˜ v∗)w en e e dm o r ei n f o r m a t i o nt h a tj u s tt h ef a c t u a l
value function ˜ v.
We show here that we can identify separately diﬀerent components of the diﬀerential
value ˜ v. Given this decomposition we will be able to construct the counterfactual function
11˜ v∗. Proposition 2 provides a characterization of the choice probability function that will be
very useful to identify and to estimate the counterfactuals.
PROPOSITION 2: The optimal choice probability function P is the unique ﬁxed point of
the mapping Ψ(P),w h e r e





and (1) ˜ ϕ(x)=ϕ(1,x) − ϕ(0,x),w h e r eϕ(a,x) is the value of choosing alternative a today
and then select alternative 0 forever in the future; and (2) ˜ δ(x,P)=δ(1,x,P) − δ(0,x,P),
where δ(a,x,P) is the value of behaving optimally in the future minus the value of choosing








( G(x0,P)+δ(0,x 0,P))dFx(x0|a,x) (21)
where G(x,P) is McFadden’s surplus function that is deﬁned as
R
max{0; ˜ v(x) −˜ ε}dF˜ ε(˜ ε),
and it can be represented as a function of the optimal choice probability P(x) as
G(x,P)=P(x) F
−1




−∞ ˜ εd F ˜ ε(˜ ε) . (22)
Proposition 2 establishes that we can decompose the diﬀerential value function ˜ v(x) in
two terms: ˜ ϕ(x) and ˜ δ(x,P). This decomposition has several important implications. First,
to obtain the choice probability function all what we need is the the functions ˜ ϕ and F˜ ε and
the discount factor. Given this information we can construct the mapping Ψ and obtain
the choice probability function as the ﬁxed point of this mapping. Therefore, all what we
need to obtain the counterfactual probability function P∗ is the counterfactual function
˜ ϕ∗. A second important implication of this Proposition is that the function ˜ ϕ does not
depend on the agent’s optimal behavior and therefore on the optimal choice probabilities.
We show below that it is quite straightforward to calculate the counterfactual function ˜ ϕ∗.
In particular, this counterfactual is just the sum of the factual function ˜ ϕ and a function
that only depends on the utility change τ. Therefore, all what we need to identify ˜ ϕ∗ and
P∗ is to identify ˜ ϕ.
We now prove the identiﬁcation of the function ˜ ϕ when the distribution F˜ ε is known.
Given F˜ ε it is clear from equation (22) that the surplus function is identiﬁed from the
choice probabilities. Equation (21) deﬁnes implicitly δ(0,.,P) as the unique ﬁxed point of a
12contraction mapping. Since the surplus function G is identiﬁed, it is clear that δ(0,.,P) is
also identiﬁed. Furthermore, δ(1,.,P) is β
R
(G(x0)+δ(0,x 0,P)) dFx(x0|1,x) and therefore
it is also identiﬁed. Finally, the optimal choice probability function is such that P(x)=
F˜ ε(˜ ϕ(x)+˜ δ(x,P)).G i v e nt h a tF˜ ε(.) is invertible and that ˜ δ(.,P)=δ(1,.,P)−δ(0,.,P) has
been identiﬁed, we can identiﬁed ˜ ϕ(.) as:
˜ ϕ(x)=F
−1
˜ ε (P(x)) − ˜ δ(x,P) (23)
The identiﬁed functions δ(0,.), δ(1,.),a n d˜ ϕ(.) depend both on agents’ preferences and
on agents’ beliefs. Can we separately identify preferences and beliefs? No, without fur-
ther restrictions. An assumption that identiﬁes the utility function is the "normalization"
u(0,x)=0for any x ∈ X. Under this assumption we have that ˜ ϕ(x)=u(1,x).T h i st y p e
of "normalization" is innocuous in static models because it does not aﬀect the estimation
of counterfactual probabilities, which only depend on utility diﬀerences and not on utility
levels. However, this normalization is not innocuous in dynamic models. In dynamic models,
the counterfactual choice probabilities depend on utility levels and not only on utility dif-
ferences. Therefore, if the true utility u(0,x) is not zero but we estimate the counterfactual
probabilities under the assumption that it is zero, our estimates will be inconsistent and in
some cases they can be very seriously biased.
Proposition 3 shows that given the distribution function F˜ ε we can identify the counter-
factual choice probability function from the factual choice probabilities.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that the discount factor β, the distribution function F˜ ε,a n dt h e
optimal choice probability function P are known. Then, the counterfactual choice probability
function P∗ is identiﬁed. In particular, P∗ is the unique ﬁxed point of the mapping Ψ∗(P),
where
Ψ
∗(P)(x) ≡ F˜ ε
³
˜ ϕ(x)+T(1,x) − T(0,x)+˜ δ(x,P)
´
(24)
The functions ˜ ϕ and ˜ δ are the same as in the "factual" mapping Ψ(P) and they are identiﬁed
from the factual choice probabilities. The functions T(0,.) and T(1,.) only depend on the
change in the current utility function τ and they can be obtained using the equation:
T(a,x)=τ(a,x)+β
Z
T(0,x 0) dFx(x0|a,x) (25)
3.2.2 Identiﬁcation with unknown F˜ ε
We now consider identiﬁcation of counterfactual probabilities when the distribution function
F˜ ε is unknown and it is nonparametrically speciﬁed. We consider the same speciﬁcation of
the current utility as in Assumption 2 for the identiﬁcation of the static model. However, in
13the dynamic model we need additional conditions for the identiﬁcation of the distribution of
unobservables. The reason is that the state variable w aﬀects the optimal choice probability
not only through the current utility function but also through the expected discounted value
of future utilities. Knowledge of the function ˜ y(w,z) is not suﬃcient to identify F˜ ε because
the eﬀect of w in the optimal probability function (though future expected utilities) depends
on the function ˜ c(.) that is unknown. Assumption 3 establishes a condition that guarantees
that this eﬀe c td o e sn o te x i s ta n dt h a tt h ee ﬀect of w on current and future utilities can be
obtained given the functions ˜ y(.,.) and F˜ ε.





That is, the state variable w is strictly exogenous with respect to the decision variable a.
Furthermore, for any w0, w1 and w0 with w0 <w 1, we have that Fw(w0|w0) ≥ Fw(w0|w1).
Under Assumptions 2 and 3 we can decompose the function ϕ(a,x) in two components,
ϕ(a,w,z)=Y (a,w,z)+C(a,z) (27)
where the functions Y and C are implicitly deﬁned by the recursive expressions:
Y (a,w,z)=y(a,w,z)+β
Z





Given that the econometrician knows the outcome function y(.,.,.), the function Y (.,.,.) is
identiﬁed. Thus, the optimal choice probability function is:
P(w,z) ≡ F˜ ε
³
˜ Y (w,z)+ ˜ C(z)+˜ δ(w,z,P)
´
(29)
where the function ˜ δ is the same as in Propositions 2 and 3. Furthermore, Assumptions 2
and 3 imply that the function ˜ Y (w,z)+˜ δ(w,z,P) is strictly increasing in w.
If the function ˜ δ were known, then the proof of identiﬁcation of the probability distrib-
ution F˜ ε would be very similar to the one in Proposition 1 for the static model. However,
˜ δ depends on F˜ ε t h a ti st h eo b j e c tt h a tw ew a n tt oi d e n t i f y .T h e r e f o r e ,t h e r ei sar e c u r s i v e
problem: we need to know ˜ δ to identify F˜ ε b u tw en e e dt ok n o wF˜ ε to obtain ˜ δ. If this recur-
sive problem has a unique ﬁxed point, then the distribution of unobservable state variables
is nonparametrically identiﬁed.
To show that F˜ ε is identiﬁed we proceed in the following way. The diﬀerential value
function is ˜ v(w,z)=˜ Y (w,z)+ ˜ C(z)+˜ δ(w,z). This function is unknown both because ˜ C
14is unknown and because ˜ δ depends on the distribution F˜ ε. However, we show that ˜ v can
be described as the unique ﬁxed point of a mapping that depends only on the data and the
discount factor β. This mapping is Λ(˜ v) ≡ {Λ(˜ v)(x):x ∈ X} with
Λ(˜ v)(x)=
³




˜ δ(w,z;˜ v) − ˜ δ(m(z),z;˜ v)
´
(30)
where: (1) m(.) is a function from Z into W such that m(z) is the value w ∈ W that makes
P(w,z)=0 .5; and (2) the function ˜ δ has the same deﬁnition as above but we emphasize
its dependence on ˜ v by including this function as an argument. More importantly, we can
represent the surplus function and therefore ˜ δ as a function of ˜ v and P instead of as a
function of P and F˜ ε as in equation (22). That is, under Assumption 3 we have that the
surplus function can be written as:






Proposition 4 proves these results, it shows that Λ is a contraction mapping, and it ﬁnally
establishes that the functions F˜ ε and ˜ ϕ are nonparametrically identiﬁed.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold and that the discount factor
β, the function ˜ Y , and the choice probability function P are known. Then, the function
˜ ϕ = ˜ Y + ˜ C is identiﬁed on X, and the probability distribution F˜ ε is identiﬁed on ˜ ν(X) ≡
{˜ ν(x):x ∈ X}.
Proposition 5 shows that the counterfactual probability function is nonparametrically
identiﬁed and describes the procedure to compute this function.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold and that the discount factor β,
the function ˜ Y , and the choice probability function P are known. Then, the counterfactual
probability function P∗ is identiﬁed. More speciﬁcally, P∗ is the unique ﬁxed point of the
mapping Ψ∗ deﬁned in Proposition 3, where the functions ˜ ϕ and F˜ ε that appear in the
deﬁnition of this mapping have been identiﬁed as described in Proposition 4.
4 Estimation method
This section presents a nonparametric procedure for the estimation of counterfactual choice
probabilities that is based on the previous identiﬁcation results. Suppose that we have a
random sample {ai,w i,z i : i =1 ,2,...,n}. First, we use the recursive formula in equation
(28) to obtain ﬁrst the function Y (0,x), and then the functions Y (1,x),a n d˜ Y (x).W e
distinguish ﬁve steps in this method.
15Step 1: Estimation of the choice probability function P. We use a Nadaraya-Watson (kernel)
estimator because it guarantees the continuous diﬀerentiability of the estimated function. To
guarantee the strict monotonicity with respect to w we use the method in Hall and Huang
(2001). These authors propose a simple method for monotonizing kernel-type estimators like
the Nadaraya-Watson estimator.
Step 2: Estimation of the function m. The estimated function ˆ m : Z → W is deﬁned as the
value of w that solves the equation ˆ P(w,z)=0 .5 for given z ∈ Z.W eu s eN e w t o n ’ sm e t h o d
to ﬁnd ˆ m(z).T h a ti s ,ˆ m(z) is the limit of the sequence deﬁned by the iterative formula:




ˆ P(wK,z) − 0.5
´
(32)
Given the strict monotonicity of our estimator ˆ P(.,z), Newton’s method always converges
to ˆ m(z).
Step 3: Estimation of the functions ˜ v and ˜ C.G i v e n˜ Y , β and the estimated functions ˆ P
and ˆ m we can construct a consistent estimator of the mapping Λ as deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 3 0 ) .
Then, our estimator of ˜ v is the unique ﬁxed point of the contraction mapping ˆ Λ.G i v e nt h i s
estimator ˆ v, it is straightforward to obtain a consistent estimator of the function ˜ C as:
ˆ C(z)=−˜ Y (ˆ m(z),z) − ˜ δ(ˆ m(z),z;ˆ v) (33)
Step 4: Estimation of the distribution function F˜ ε. For any real value v ∈ ˜ v(X) the estimator







where w∗(v,z) is the inverse function of ˆ v(w,z) with respect to w.T h a t i s , w∗(v,z) is a
function that provides the value of w such that ˆ v(w,z)=v. We use also Newton’s method
to ﬁnd w∗(v,z), i.e., we iterate until convergence in the formula
wK+1 = wK −
∂ˆ v(wK,z)
∂w
(ˆ v(wK,z) − v) (35)
Again, the strict monotonicity of ˆ v(.,z) guarantees that Newton’s method always converges
to w∗(v,z).
Step 5: Estimation of P∗. Given the estimated functions ˆ ϕ = ˜ Y + ˆ C and ˆ F˜ ε and the
discount factor β, we can construct a consistent estimator of the mapping Ψ∗.L e tˆ Ψ∗ be
this estimator. Then, our estimator of the choice probability function P∗ is the unique ﬁxed
point of the mapping ˆ Ψ∗.
The main computational cost in this procedure comes from the computation of the ﬁxed
points of the contraction mappings ˆ Λ and ˆ Ψ∗. This cost is equivalent to solving the dynamic
16programming problem twice. It is of the same order of magnitude as estimating a parametric
version of the model using the two-step method in Hotz and Miller (1993), or the nested
pseudo likelihood algorithm in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002). In the implementation of
this method in next section, we discretize the state space, including w,t os o l v et h eﬁxed
point problems. To give an idea of the simplicity of the method, for a model with two state
variables, 10,000 cells in the state space, and 1,000 observations, the CPU time of the whole
method was less than six seconds using a program written in GAUSS language and an Intel
Pentium processor of 2.2MHz. Though the computational cost increases exponentially with
the number of cells in the state space, it is clear that we can use this method for any dynamic
programming model that we can solve once in a reasonable amount time.
We do not derive in this paper the asymptotic distribution of our estimator of P∗.
However, this estimator is consistent under standard regularity conditions. The Nadaraya-
Watson estimator of P is consistent, and the estimators in steps 2 to 5 (i.e., ˆ m, ˆ Λ, ˜ v, ˆ C, ˆ F˜ ε,
w∗, ˆ Ψ∗,a n d ˆ P∗)a r ec o n t i n u o u sa n dd i ﬀerentiable functions of the estimator ˆ P.T h e r e f o r e ,
all these estimators are consistent. The derivation of the rate of convergence of ( ˆ P∗ − P∗)
and of suﬃcient conditions for its asymptotic normality is a more complicated problem that
we do not consider in this problem. In any case, the computation of a consistent estimator of
the asymptotic variance is complicated. Furthermore, it is likely that this asymptotic vari-
ance is not a good approximation to the ﬁnite sample variance for the range of sample sizes
that we have in actual applications. Therefore, bootstrap is probably the most convenient
approach to estimate the variance of this estimator.
5M o n t e C a r l o E x p e r i m e n t
This section presents a Monte Carlo experiment where we apply the previous nonparametric
method to evaluate the eﬀects of a subsidy to early machine replacement using the model
described in section 2.4. The main purpose of this experiment is to analyze the ﬁnite sample
bias and variance of the estimator using the type data that we can ﬁnd in actual applications.
5.1 Experiment Design
Table 1 describes the design of the Monte Carlo experiment. The ﬁrst panel in this table
presents the form of the structural functions. These parameters have been chosen to generate
an age distribution and a replacement probability function that resembles the empirical
results in Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999).5 Figures 1 and 2 present the probability
5These authors study plants’ investment in machinery and equipment using data of US manufacturing
plants from the Longitudinal Research Database. They deﬁne "machine replacement" as an investment rate
17of replacement and the steady-state distribution of age for our model before the policy
intervention. The average probability of replacement is 19%, the average age of capital is
2.42 years, and only 2.5% of the replacements occur at ages above 5 years of age.
The second panel in Table 1 presents the policy that we want to evaluate. This policy
has the form described in equation (12). It is a subsidy to ﬁrms that replace their machine
at ages between 3 and 5 years. The maximum subsidy is obtained when replacement occurs
a tt h et h i r dy e a r ,a n dt h ea m o u n to fs u b s i d yi s12% of the price of a new machine (i.e.,
0.12 ∗ pBUY). The subsidy decreases when the machine gets older such that it is 8% of the
price of a new machine in the fourth year, 4% in the ﬁfth year, and no subsidy for older ages.
Figures 3 and 4 present the eﬀect of this policy on the probability of capital replacement
and on the age distribution. The probability of replacement decreases at ages lower than 3
years because the new policy creates an incentive to delay replacement in order to get the
subsidy. However, the policy increases the probability of retirement at any age greater or
equal than 3 years. Overall the policy encourages early machine replacement. The average
age of a machine in steady state goes from 2.42 years to 2.07 years. Aggregate productivity
in steady state increases by 2.69%.
I nt h eM o n t eC a r l oe x p e r i m e n tw eu s e1,000 replications of a cross section of 1,000
ﬁrms. To construct each of these cross sections we take random draws of (ω,Age) from
the joint steady-state distribution of these variables. Given these draws we generate the
replacement decisions by taking random draws from a Bernoulli with probability P(ω,Age).
Figures 5 and 6 present frequency estimates of the age distribution and the probability of
replacement conditional on age for a typical sample in this Monte Carlo experiment. The 95%
conﬁdence bands illustrate that conditional on the machine age there is still very signiﬁcant
heterogeneity or sample variability in ﬁrms’ replacement decisions.
5.2 Some estimation issues
All the functions have been estimated over a discrete and ﬁnite set of values of the state
variables. The range of values for the age of capital consists of the integers between 0 and
the maximum age observed in the sample plus one, i.e., typically the integers between 0 and
11. For the productivity shock we consider a uniform grid with 600 cells over the interval
[−5sω,5sω],w h e r esω is the sample standard deviation of the productivity shock. In a sample
of 1,000 observations we typically ﬁnd several observations out of the interval [−3sω,3sω].
However, it is very unlikely to observe values greater in absolute value than four times the
standard deviation. Therefore, we do some extrapolation outside the support of ω in the
of 20% or above.
18sample. As we explain below, we need this extrapolation to estimate the function m.W e
exploit the continuity and monotonicity of P with respect to ω to do this extrapolation.
Figure 7 presents the function ˜ Y (ω,Age). This function represents the present value of
output if the machine is replaced today and then it is never replaced again in the future,
minus the present value of output if the machine is not replaced neither today or in the future.
Given the speciﬁcation of the production technology, the function ˜ Y is strictly increasing in
both arguments.
Following the description of the estimation procedure in section 4, the ﬁrst step consists
in the estimation of the choice probability function P(ω,Age) ≡ E(ai|ωi = ω,Agei = Age)
using a Nadaraya-Watson estimator. For the sake of computational simplicity we use Silver-
man’s rule of thumb to choose the value of the bandwidths for the two conditioning variables.
Given the Nadaraya-Watson estimates, we impose monotonicity with respect to ω and Age
using the method in Hall and Huang (2001). Figures 8 presents the true and the estimated
replacement probability function for three diﬀerent values of the productivity shock. We
also report bootstraped conﬁdence intervals. There are two important features to comment
on these estimates. First, note that the amplitude of the conﬁdence intervals here is smaller
than in the frequency estimates in Figure 6. There are three factors that contribute to the
narrowing of the conﬁdence intervals: (1) we are conditioning not only on age but also on the
productivity shock and this reduces the variance of the residuals; (2) the kernel estimator im-
poses smoothness and this reduces the variance of the estimator, though it also introduces a
ﬁnite sample bias; and (3) imposing monotonicity also reduces the variance of the estimator.
A second important feature of these estimates is that they are biased for values of age lower
than 2 or greater than 6. The true replacement probability is outside the 95% conﬁdence
interval for these values of age. The reason of this bias is that our criterion for the choice
of bandwidth (i.e., Silverman’s rule of thumb) introduces over-smoothing in our estimates.
Though we could eliminate this over-smoothing by using a cross-validation method to choose
the bandwidth, we prefer to analyze the performance of our estimator when we have certain
over-smoothing because this is a common scenario in kernel estimation.
Figure 9 presents the steady-state age distribution induced by the Nadaraya-Watson
estimate of the choice probability function.6 We also report the true age distribution and
bootstraped conﬁdence intervals. This estimate is also signiﬁcantly more precise that the
raw frequency estimate in Figure 5. Note that the bias in ˆ P does not have important eﬀects
on the estimation of the steady-state age distribution.
In the second step of the procedure, we use ˆ P to estimate the function m.I ti si nt h i ss t e p
6We use the recursive expression in (13) to obtain the joint steady distribution H(ω,Age) a n dt h e nw e
integrate over ω.
19where we need estimates of the P function for values of ω outside the range of variation in a
typical sample. The reason is that for Age > 8 we need very large values of the productivity
shock in order to have ˆ P(ω,Age)=0 .5. Similarly, for Age < 3 the values of ω that solve
the equation ˆ P(ω,Age)=0 .5 are very small. Figure 10 presents the true and the estimated
m function for a typical sample.
5.3 Results of the experiment
The main results of the Monte Carlo experiment are presented in Figures 11 to 14 and in
Table 2. The two estimated functions that play the most important role in the estimation
of the policy eﬀects are ˜ C and F˜ ε.F i g u r e1 1p r e s e n t st h et r u ef u n c t i o n ˜ C and the quantiles
2.5%, 50%,a n d97.5% in the Monte Carlo distribution of the estimated function. Though the
estimation is precise, there is ﬁnite sample bias. This bias might be due to over-smoothing in
the estimation of the replacement probability, but it might be also a more general property
of our estimator that appears even we use cross-validation in the estimation of P.T h a ti s ,
the estimator ˆ C is a very nonlinear function of the estimator ˆ P, and though it is consistent it
can be biased for relatively small samples. Figure 12 presents the Monte Carlo distribution
of the estimate of the standard deviation of ˜ ε. There is also a very clear upward bias in this
estimation.
Though, by construction, the upward biases in the estimates of ˜ C and F˜ ε.compensate with
each other in the estimation of the factual choice probability P, that is not necessarily the
case in the estimation of the counterfactual P∗. Figures 13 and 14 show that the estimator of
the counterfactual (steady-state) age distribution is not biased. The estimated counterfactual
is close to the true one, both in terms of median and of dispersion.
Table 2 presents more aggregate measures of the estimated policy eﬀects on average
age and productivity. The factual average age of capital and the average productivity are
estimated without any bias, but there is a small upward bias in the estimated counterfactuals.
Despite this bias, the estimated eﬀects are very precise and close to the true eﬀects.
6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents a nonparametric approach to evaluate the behavioral eﬀects of counter-
factual policies using dynamic discrete decision models. Though agents’ preferences cannot
be nonparametrically identiﬁed in this class of models, we show that the behavioral eﬀects
of counterfactual changes in preferences are identiﬁed under similar conditions as in static
models. Our results apply both to ﬁnite horizon and inﬁnite horizon decision processes.
Based on this identiﬁcation result we propose a nonparametric procedure to estimate the
20behavioral eﬀects of counterfactual experiments in this class of models. The computational
cost of this method is equivalent to solving the dynamic programming problem twice (i.e.,
before and after the policy change). We have analyzed the ability of this method to provide
informative estimates of policy eﬀects using a Monte Carlo experiment. In this experiment
we evaluate the eﬀects of an investment subsidy program in the context of a model of ma-
chine replacement. Using a sample with 1,000 observations we ﬁnd a small ﬁnite sample
bias in the estimates of some policy eﬀects. Despite this bias, the method provides precise
estimates of the actual policy eﬀects.
21APPENDIX
P R O O FO FP R O P O S I T I O N1 .
[1] Given the form of the utility function, the optimal choice probability is:
P(w,z)=F˜ ε (˜ y(w,z)+˜ c(z))
The function P(.,.) is identiﬁed on X.F o rz ∈ Z,l e tm(z) be the value w ∈ W that solves
the equation P(w,z)=0 .5 . Assumption 2(iii) implies that m(z) exits and is unique for
any z ∈ Z. Therefore, identiﬁcation of P(.,.) on X implies the identiﬁcation of m(.) on Z.
Given that the median of ˜ ε is zero, we have that for any z ∈ ¯ Z:
˜ y(m(z),z)+˜ c(z)=0
or ˜ c(z)=−˜ y(m(z),z). Therefore, the function ˜ c(.) is identiﬁed on Z, and the function
˜ u(.)=˜ y(.,.)+˜ c(.) is identiﬁed on X.
[2] Now, we prove the identiﬁcation of F˜ ε.F o rz ∈ Z,d e ﬁne ˜ u(W ×{ z}) ⊆ R as the range
of possible values that the function ˜ u(.) can take over the space W ×{ z}.F o r z ∈ Z and
e ∈ ˜ u(W ×{ z}),l e tw(e,z) be the value w ∈ W that solves the equation ˜ u(w(e,z),z)=e.
Since ˜ u(.,.) is strictly increasing in w,t h ev a l u ew(e,z) exists and it is unique. Furthermore,
it is identiﬁed given ˜ u(.,.). Thus, we can identiﬁed F˜ ε on ˜ u(W ×{ z}) as:
F˜ ε(e)=F˜ ε (˜ u(w(e,z),z))=P (w(e,z),z)
We can use diﬀerent values of z to identify F˜ ε over the whole set ˜ u(W × Z).
[3] The counterfactual choice probability function is P∗(x)=F˜ ε (˜ u(x)+˜ τ(x)).G i v e nt h a t
we have identiﬁed ˜ u(.) on X and F˜ ε (.) on ˜ u(X), it is clear that we can obtain P∗(x) at any
value x such that ˜ u(x)+˜ τ(x) ∈ ˜ u(X).
P R O O FO FP R O P O S I T I O N2 .First, we show that the diﬀerential value function ˜ v(x)
c a nb ew r i t t e na s˜ ϕ(x)+˜ δ(x,P).










Given the deﬁnition of the surplus function in the enunciation of this Proposition, we have
that: Z
maxj∈A { v(j,x0)+ε0(j) } dFε(ε0)= v(0,x 0)+G(x0)







We can apply the same decomposition to the value v(0,x 0) that appears in this expression.












G(x00) dFx(x00|0,x 0) dFx(x0|a,x)























The second term in the right hand side is the present value of choosing alternative 0 forever in
the future given that the current choice and the current state are a and x, respectively. The
t h i r dt e r mi nt h er i g h th a n ds i d ei st h ed i ﬀerence between the value of choosing always the
optimal alternative and the value of choosing always alternative 0. Then, given the deﬁnitions









































Taking into account the deﬁnition of the surplus function as
R
max{0; ˜ v(x) − ˜ ε}dF˜ ε(˜ ε),a n d
that ˜ v(x)=F
−1
˜ ε (P(x)), we have that this surplus function can be written as:
G(P(x)) = P(x)( ˜ v(x) − E (˜ ε|˜ ε ≤ ˜ v(x)))
= P(x) F
−1
˜ ε (P(x)) −
R F−1
˜ ε (P(x))
−∞ ˜ εd F ˜ ε(˜ ε)
23[2] Thus, v(a,x)=ϕ(a,x)+δ(a,x,P). This implies that we the expression P(x)=F˜ ε(˜ v(x))
can be rewritten as:
P(x)=F˜ ε(˜ ϕ(x)+˜ δ(x,P))
Therefore, the optimal choice probability function P is a ﬁxed point of the mapping Ψ(P)
where Ψ(P)(x) ≡ F˜ ε(˜ ϕ(x)+˜ δ(x,P)).T h i si sap a r t i c u l a rc a s eo ft h eﬁxed point probability
mapping in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002). Proposition 1(i) in Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2002) shows that this mapping has a unique ﬁxed point.
P R O O FO FP R O P O S I T I O N3 .By Proposition 2, the counterfactual probability func-
tion P∗ is the unique ﬁxed point of the mapping Ψ∗(P),w h e r e
Ψ











∗(0,x,P) are associated with
the counterfactual utility function u∗(a,x).
[1] Identiﬁcation of ˜ δ
∗
. T a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h ed e ﬁnition of the functions δ(0,.,.) and
δ(1,.,.) in Proposition 2, we can see that these functions depend on the probability distrib-
ution F˜ ε and on the discount factor, but they do not depend on the current utility function.
Therefore, ˜ δ
∗
(.,.)=˜ δ(.,.) and this function is identiﬁed as we have shown before.
[2] Identiﬁcation of ˜ ϕ∗(.): Taking into account the expressions for ϕ(a,x) in the proof of




































where T(a,x) is the term associated with the values of the function τ(.,.). Therefore,
˜ ϕ
∗(x)=˜ ϕ(x)+T(1,x) − T(0,x)






24Given T(0,.), we can obtained T(1,x) as τ(1,x)+β
Z
T(0,x 0) dFx(x0|1,x). Since the function
τ(.,.) is known, it is clear that T(0,.) and T(1,.) are identiﬁed.
[3] Identiﬁcation of P∗. Thus, P∗ is the unique ﬁxed point of the mapping Ψ∗(P),w h e r e :
Ψ
∗(P)(x) ≡ F˜ ε
³
˜ ϕ(x)+T(1,x) − T(0,x)+˜ δ(x,P)
´
We have shown that the functions ˜ ϕ(.), T(1,.), T(0,.),a n d˜ δ(.,.) are identiﬁed. Thus, given
F˜ ε, the counterfactual probability function is identiﬁed.
P R O O FO FP R O P O S I T I O N4 . The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show
that the distribution function F˜ ε is uniquely identiﬁed given P(.) and the diﬀerential value
function ˜ v(.). Second, we show that, for given P, ˜ ϕ and β,t h ed i ﬀerential value function ˜ v
is the unique ﬁxed point of a contraction mapping. Therefore, we conclude that there is a
unique distribution function F˜ ε that is consistent with given P, ˜ ϕ and β.
[1] Identiﬁcation of F˜ ε for given P and ˜ v. Suppose that we know P(x) and ˜ v(x).for
every x ∈ X.D e ﬁne the set ˜ v(X) ≡ {˜ v(x):x ∈ X}. Under Assumption 3, the function ˜ v
is continuous and strictly increasing in w. Therefore, there is an inverse function w∗(v,z)
such that, for any v ∈ ˜ v(X) and for any z ∈ Z,w eh a v et h a t˜ v(w∗(v,z),z)=v. The model
implies that P(w,z)=F˜ ε(˜ v(w,z)). Therefore, it is clear that for any v ∈ ˜ v(X) we can
obtain F˜ ε(v) as P(w∗(v,z),z).


















where G(x;˜ v) is the surplus function
Z
maxj∈A {0; ˜ v(x) −˜ ε} dF˜ ε(˜ ε). Given this description
of the surplus, the function ˜ v is a ﬁxed point of a mapping that depends on ˜ ϕ, β and F˜ ε.
However, we can also represent ˜ v as a ﬁxed point of a mapping that depends on ˜ ϕ, β and
P, but not on F˜ ε. First, notice that G(x)=P(x)˜ v(x) −
R ˜ v(x)
−∞ ˜ εd F ˜ ε(˜ ε). Second, using the
relationship P(w,z)=F˜ ε(˜ v(w,z)) and the continuity and strict monotonicity of P(w,z) with
respect to w,w eh a v et h a t
R ˜ v(w,z)




∂w du. Therefore, the surplus
function can be written as:






And this implies that ˜ v can be described as a ﬁxed point of a mapping that depends on ˜ ϕ,
β and P, but not on F˜ ε.
25Let Λ(˜ v) ≡ {Λ(˜ v)(x):x ∈ X} be this mapping. Now, we show that Λ is a contraction
mapping and therefore it has a unique ﬁxed point. To prove this we use Blackwell’s suﬃcient
conditions for a contraction (see Theorem 3.3 in Stockey and Lucas, 1989). These suﬃcient
conditions are monotonicity and discounting.
(a) Monotonicity: We should prove that for any two functions ˜ v0 and ˜ v1 such that
˜ v1(x) − ˜ v0(x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ X,t h e nΛ(˜ v1)(x) − Λ(˜ v0)(x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ X.U s i n gt h e
deﬁnition of the mapping Λ above, a suﬃcient condition for the second inequality is that
G(x;˜ v1) − G(x;˜ v0) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ X.N o t et h a t :
G(x;˜ v

















Solving by parts the integral, it is straightforward to show that:
G(x;˜ v
1) − G(x;˜ v
0)=
R w
−∞ P(u,z) du ≥ 0
(b) Discounting: We should prove that the exists some constant λ ∈ [0,1) such that for
any function ˜ v, any constant c,a n da n yx ∈ X we have that Λ(˜ v + c)(x) ≤ Λ(˜ v)(x)+λx.
We start obtaining G(x;˜ v + c).









∂w du = G(x;˜ v)
Therefore, there is discounting in the surplus function. Furthermore, given the deﬁnition of
Λ, it is clear that Λ(˜ v + c)(x)=Λ(˜ v)(x), i.e., there is discounting in the mapping Λ.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. By Proposition 3, P∗ is the unique ﬁxed point of
the mapping Ψ∗. This mapping depends on the known functions T(1,.) − T(0,.),o nt h e
discount factor β, and on the functions ˜ ϕ and F˜ ε. By Proposition 4, the functions ˜ ϕ and F˜ ε
are identiﬁed given β, ˜ Y ,a n dP. Therefore, the mapping Ψ∗ and its unique ﬁxed point P∗
are identiﬁed.
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30Table 1
Design of the Monte Carlo Experiment
Production Function y(Kt,ωt)=Kα
t exp(ωt),w i t h α =0 .95
Stochastic Process ωt ωt = ρω t−1 + ηt,w i t h ρ =0 .8
ση =0 .2
Transition capital Kt = at +( 1− at)( 1− λ) Kt−1,w i t h λ =0 .1
Maintenance costs mc(Kt)=( 1− a) mc (Aget +1 ) ,w i t h mc =0 .01
Replacement costs rc(Kt−1)=pBUY − pSELL Kt−1,w i t h pBUY =1 .6
pSELL =0 .4
Distribution of ˜ εt ˜ εt is N(0,σ2
˜ ε),w i t h σ˜ ε =0 .2
Time discount factor β =0 .95
Counterfactual policy As in equation (12) with τ0 =0 .12 pBUY
τ1 =0 .04 pBUY
Age =3 , Age =5
Sample size Cross section of 1,000 ﬁrms
Monte Carlo replications Number of replications = 1,000.
31Table 2
Statistics from Monte Carlo Experiment
True Value Empirical Median 95% Conf. Interval
Monte Carlo Monte Carlo
A v g .A g eB e f o r eP o l i c y 2.451 2.451 (2.349 , 2.556)
Avg. Age After Policy 2.086 1.973 (1.849 , 2.178)
Policy Eﬀect on Avg. Age -0.365 -0.473 (-0.594 , -0.283)
Avg. Productivity Before Policy 0.797 0.797 (0.790 , 0.803)
Avg. Productivity After Policy 0.823 0.831 (0.816 , 0.840)
Policy Eﬀect on Avg. Productivity 0.026 0.033 (0.020 , 0.042)
32Figure 1
Probability of Replacement Conditional on Age and Productivity: P(ω,Age)
True Model Before Policy Change
Figure 2
Steady-State Distribution of Age H(Age)
True Model Before Policy Change
33Figure 3
Probability of Replacement Conditional on Age: ¯ P(Age)
True Model Before and After Policy Change
Figure 4
Steady-State Distribution of Age H(Age)
True Model Before and After Policy Change
34Figure 5
Frequency Estimate of Age Distribution
with 95% Conﬁdence Bands (based on asymptotic distribution)
Figure 6
Frequency Estimate of Probability of Replacement Conditional on Age
with 95% Conﬁdence Bands (based on asymptotic distribution)
35Figure 7
Function ˜ Y(Age,ω)=Y(1,Age,ω) − Y(0,Age,ω)
36Figure 8
Nadaraya-Watson Estimates of Replacement Probability ˆ P(ω,Age)
with Bootstraped 95% Conﬁdence Bands
ω = −0.514 (Percentile 0.5%)
ω = 0.0 (Percentile 50%)
ω = 0.514 (Percentile 99.5%)
37Figure 9
Estimated Steady-State Distribution of Age
with Bootstraped 95% Conﬁdence Bands
Figure 10
True and Estimated m Function
with Bootstraped 95% Conﬁdence Bands
38Figure 11
True and Estimated ˜ C Function
Quantiles 2.5%, 50%, and 97.5% from Monte Carlo Distribution
Figure 12
Monte Carlo Distribution of the Estimated
Standard Deviation of ˜ ε
39Figure 13
Eﬀect of Subsidy on Age Distribution
True Eﬀect and Median Estimated Eﬀect from Monte Carlo Distribution
Figure 14
Eﬀect of Policy on Age Distribution
Median, Quantile 2.5% and Quantile 97.5% from Monte Carlo Distribution
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